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I
INTRODUCTION: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM DEFINED
Judicial activism and judicial restraint describe the relationship between
the judiciary and the political branches of government. In the context of
Japan, they refer to the relationship between the Supreme Court and inferior
courts, on the one hand, and the Diet, the Cabinet, the bureaucracy, and the
analogous policymakers of prefectural and local governments, on the other.
Judicial activism and restraint have been defined in more than one way. One
such definition is that a court exhibits activism when it exercises the power of
judicial review regardless of whether it declares a governmental action
constitutional or unconstitutional. In this study, however, judicial activism is
defined in terms of conflict between the courts and the political branches on
constitutional policies.' A court is activist whenever it declares public policies
unconstitutional. Conversely, a court is self-restrained whenever it upholds
the constitutionality of public policies.
The Meiji Constitution of 1889 did not provide for the power of judicial
review. Moreover, it did not recognize the judiciary as independent from the
Diet and the Cabinet. As part of the executive branch, the judiciary was not
empowered to examine the constitutionality of actions of the Diet or the
Cabinet. Furthermore, an administrative court, separate from the ordinary
courts of law, maintained exclusive jurisdiction over any administrative
disputes. Since this administrative court, the privy council, was for all
practical purposes dysfunctional in reviewing whatever constitutional disputes
might have been raised, there was no institution that effectively checked the
legality or constitutionality of governmental policies and actions.
Judicial review has been firmly established since 1947. The administrative
court, the privy council, and all other forms of special tribunals have been
abolished. Thejudiciary, headed by the Supreme Court, now has the final say
as to what the law is in any legal dispute. With the power of judicial review
and the working principle of stare decisis, the courts have come to make case
law and to delineate through litigants the constitutional boundaries of each
branch of the national and local governments.
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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The Japanese judiciary presently consists of one Supreme Court, eight
high courts with six branch high courts, fifty district courts with 242 branch
district courts, fifty family courts with 242 branch family courts, and 575
summary courts. Local offices of family courts are also placed at the seats of
ninety-six summary courts in some remote areas.2 These courts are
hierarchically structured, with the Supreme Court at the top and the summary
courts at the bottom of the judicial pyramid. The number of judges on the
bench ranges from one at the summary court, family court, and district court,
to three at the high court, and to fifteen at the Supreme Court. Judicial
decisions in a collegiate court are made by simple majority vote with each
judge casting one vote. Judicial review at the Supreme Court takes place
either in a fifteen-member grand bench or in one of the three five-member
petty benches.
The judiciary is hierarchically structured to serve two objectives: first, to
provide avenues of three-tiered appeals (the district court, the high court, the
Supreme Court) and, second, to provide uniform interpretation of rules of
law throughout the courts at all levels. The second objective is to be attained
by the use of stare decisis, which recognizes the precedential value of court
decisions in similar cases. Influenced by the civil law tradition of Germany,
prewar Japan did not have this concept. Yet, with the introduction ofjudicial
review in the 1947 Constitution, stare decisis has become a working doctrine
that all judges and courts now put into practice. Precedents established by
the Supreme Court bind the judicial decisionmaking of all lower courts in
most instances. If a lower court disregards decisions of the Supreme Court,
its decision is likely to be reversed upon appeal. Nonetheless, from time to
time some lower court judges reach decisions different from Supreme Court
precedents and in the long run obligate the highest tribunal to change its
precedents.
II
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OF LOWER COURTS
As defined earlier, judicial activism manifests itself when a court declares
acts or actions of the political branches and the bureaucracy unconstitutional
and invalid, resulting in a conflict between a court and a policymaker or policy
administrator. Judicial activism arises in three different situations: first, when
a new policy conflicts with existing precedent; second, when changing
precedent conflicts with existing policy; and, third, when both policy and
precedent evolve in different directions and at different paces.
First, a conflict emerges when a policymaker undertakes a policy change
while a court adheres to an existing judicial precedent and finds the policy
change unconstitutional. Such was the case in Sato v. Japan3 (the legislative
inaction case). In 1952 the Diet abolished absentee voting for physically
2. H. ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES 30 (1989).
3. 888 HanreiJih6 27 (Sapporo H. Ct., May 24, 1978).
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handicapped persons, as the system had allegedly been abused and needed to
be reformed. Consequently, severely handicapped persons had to go to a
polling station or not vote at all. In reality, over one million handicapped
voters lost the right to vote in public office elections. The plaintiff, one of the
victims of the change, filed a suit against the state for damages under the State
Compensation Code. The Sapporo District Court, Otsu Branch, found for
the plaintiff and ruled the abolition of the absentee voting system
unconstitutional as a deprivation of the constitutional right to vote. The court
was of the opinion that the Diet had exceeded the limits of its legislative
discretion and also neglected to provide the plaintiff and other handicapped
voters with any alternative method of voting. In short, the district court,
adhering to precedent, rejected the legislature's policy change as
unconstitutional, in a display of the first type of judicial activism.
This first type ofjudicial activism also appeared in 1961 when the Ministry
of Education, which is part of the national bureaucracy under the Cabinet,
introduced a nationwide standardized proficiency test to be administered to
all eighth and ninth graders by all local school boards. This administrative
change in educational policy met strong opposition from the militant Japan
Teachers Union, which had long advocated greater local control over
education. Seven defendants in Japan v. Ogawa 4 (the Iwata Prefecture
proficiency test case), were opposed to the proposed test and tried to prevent
it from being administered. They issued directives to all union members in
Iwata Prefecture to take the day off or to conduct classes as usual during the
time planned for the test. One of the defendants also blocked off the road
near a junior high school in order to keep test officials from reaching the
school. The Morioka District Court found the defendants guilty of violating
the Local Public Employees Code and the Road Traffic Code. The Sendai
High Court acquitted them, however, by relying upon the Supreme Court
decision in the Tokyo Central Post Office case. 5 According to the high court,
punishment of local public employees, such as teachers, is imposed only upon
activities of a strong antisocial nature, but the Local Public Employees Code
provides penalties for planning, conspiring to effect, instigating, or inciting
prohibited disputes. For these reasons, the court ruled that the activities of
the defendants did not amount to a crime under the Local Public Employees
Code and that the alleged violation of the Road Traffic Code was justifiable as
part of a labor dispute under the Labor Union Code. Thus the high court
disagreed with the public prosecutor's office as well as with the Minister of
Education, who had initiated the change in the nation's educational policy.
In a similar case, the Tokyo District Court acquitted executive members of
the All Agriculture and Forestry Workers' Union, composed of public
employees of the Ministry who had been charged with violating the National
Public Employees Code, which prohibits labor disputes for political
4. 30 Keishui 1179 (Sup. Ct., G.B., May 21, 1976) (rev k 762 HanreiJih6 8 (Sendai H. Ct., Dec.
9, 1974)).
5. Toyama v. Japan, 20 Keishfi 901 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 26, 1966).
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purposes. 6 In 1958, the defendants persuaded and instigated their union
members to participate in a workplace rally against proposed legislative
changes designed to strengthen the police power. Thus, the district court
became activist in relation to the Diet and the Cabinet.
A second type of judicial activism emerges when a court changes its
judicial precedent and declares existing public policies unconstitutional.
Here the court becomes a driving force behind a new social policy even
though there has been no policy change on the side of the political branches.
Some people might view this activism as undesirable judicial superlegislation.
Fukuoka Prosecutors' Office v. Yamato 7 (the patricide case) illustrates this type
of judicial activism. In the patricide case, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Article 205 of the Criminal Code that imposed either
capital punishment or life imprisonment on those guilty of causing the death
of lineal ascendants. Yet, in Japan v. Aizawa, 8 the Utsunomiya District Court
challenged the Supreme Court precedent of 1950 and declared Article 200 of
the Criminal Code an unconstitutional violation of the equality clause of the
Constitution. 9 The district court was of the opinion that Article 200
unreasonably discriminated against lineal descendants by adhering to
Confucian ethics, which stress the socially harmful and unethical nature of
killing a lineal ascendant. Thus, the district court dared to set itself apart
from Supreme Court precedent and declare the provision of the Criminal
Code unconstitutional.
Finally, a third type of judicial activism manifests itself when both a
policymaker and a court change their respective policies in different directions
and/or at different paces. In either case, a court with a new judicial policy will
find a new legislative or executive policy unconstitutional, thereby creating a
conflict with the political branch. The well-known and controversial decision
in the Naganuma Nike missile case' 0 offers a good example of this type of
judicial activism. In that case, a large number of farmers filed a suit when the
government decided to build a Nike missile base within a nearby forest
reserve without holding a public hearing as required under the Forest Code.
Issuing an injunction against the government decision to build the base, the
Sapporo District Court upheld the farmers' contentions. In the opinion of the
court, the farmers benefitted directly from the preservation of the forest
reserve, which served as a cow pasture for the local dairy business and aided
flood prevention. Therefore, the farmers, as beneficiaries of forest use, had
legal standing to sue. The proposed missile base would be unconstitutional
6. Tsuruzono v. Japan (The All Agriculture and Forestry Workers' Union Case), 27 KeishQ 547
(Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 23, 1973).
7. 4 Keishfi 2037 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 11, 1950) (rev ' 4 KeishO 2070 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., lizuka
Br., Jan. 9, 1950)).
8. Aizawa v. Japan, 27 Keishu 265 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 4, 1973) (aff'g I Keisai Gepp6 544
(Utsunomiya Dist. Ct., May 29, 1969) and rev'g 619 Hanrei Jiho 93 (Tokyo H. Ct., May 12, 1970)).
9. 1947 CONST. art. 14.
10. 36 Minshfi 1679 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Sept. 9, 1982) (revg 712 HanreiJih6 24 (Sapporo Dist.
Ct., Sept. 7, 1973) and afflg 27 Gy6han 1175 (Sapporo H. Ct., Aug. 5, 1976)).
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as a violation of the no-war clause of the Constitution." In ruling the base
unconstitutional, the district court directly challenged the Supreme Court
precedent established in 1959 in the Sunakawa case, 12 which upheld the
constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces, the U.S. Mutual Security Treaty,
and American military bases in Japan. The unequivocal deviation from the
Sunakawa ruling made the district court pronouncement controversial.
Judicial power is exercised to settle disputes between litigants. It is
exercised by the judiciary with certain limitations. Actual and concrete
disputes must exist before the court can adjudicate. No declaratory or
advisory opinions are allowed in Japan. There are also nonjusticiable types of
disputes involving state governance or the political branches of government.
Furthermore, Justice Brandeis' guidelines' 3 for invoking judicial review have
been modus operandi in Japan. In this light, many constitutional scholars
have praised the boldness and candidness of the Sapporo district court ruling
in the Naganuma Nike missile case.
So far we have examined the typology of judicial activism exhibited by
lower courts in Japan. Since there are a relatively large number of lower
courts, governmental policies and decisions are challenged by some lower
courts rather regularly. Yet, on appeal, judicial decisions holding
governmental policies unconstitutional are often reversed. That is, lower
court judicial activism is reversed to judicial restraint when a court of appeals
sustains the constitutionality of public policies and restores harmony with the
political branches. In the legislative inaction case, 14 the Sapporo High Court
held that although the failure of the Diet to reinstate the absentee system
between 1969 and 1972 was unconstitutional, the plaintiff could not establish
the necessary intentional or negligent infliction of injury by the Diet to
succeed in an action for damages under the State Compensation Code. This
decision allowed legislative inaction to remain outside effective judicial
control. Conversely, a district court may remain restrained in relation to a
governmental policy, but upon appeal a high court may reverse the district
court decision, demonstrating judicial activism.
However, what is most important is judicial review by the Supreme Court
as the court of last resort. In a large majority of instances, the Supreme Court
has sustained lower court decisions. But, in some cases, especially important
constitutional cases, the Supreme Court has reversed the judicial activism of
lower courts. In fact, except for the Aizawa patricide case,' 5 all of the activist
decisions of lower courts cited in this study have, upon appeal, been reversed
by the Supreme Court.
In the Iwata Prefecture proficiency test case, 16 the Court restored harmony
with the government by reversing the activist lower court decision. In the
11. 1947 CONST. art. 9.
12. Sakata v. Japan, 13 Keishfi 3225 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).
13. Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346-56 (1936).
14. 888 HanreiJih6 27.
15. 27 Keishii 265.
16. 30 Keishfi 1179.
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opinion of the Court, the disputes at issue did not fall within the bounds of
the worker's right to engage in disputes, because the objective of preventing
the implementation of the proficiency test had no direct relationship to
improving the financial or working conditions of teachers, but rather may be
regarded as a political objective in opposition to the educational policies of
the Ministry of Education. The Supreme Court also held the activities of the
defendants to constitute a crime under the Local Public Employees Code.
Likewise, in the All Agricultural and Forestry Workers' Union case, 17 the
Court convicted the defendants and stated that their activities encouraged
disputes as proscribed by the National Public Service Code.
It is widely asserted that the Supreme Court is so judicially restrained
toward the conservative government led by the Liberal Democratic Party
("LDP") that it discourages some reform-minded, progressive lower court
judges from deciding against the government in civil liberties and civil rights
cases. While there is some merit in this assertion, there is no empirical
verification of it.18
Especially where constitutional rights of the criminally accused are
involved, the Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional and invalid
governmental decisions and practices, while lower courts remain nonactivist
on the same issues. Where a trial was suspended for fifteen years, for
instance, the Supreme Court, and not the lower courts, agreed with the
defendant's argument that such a delay, which was not caused by the defense,
violated the defendant's constitutional right to receive a speedy trial.' 9
Likewise, the Supreme Court, and not the lower courts, became activist, as
will be elaborated shortly, in a case where a local government tried to limit the
number of pharmaceutical stores in a geographical area.
In summary, it cannot be concluded that lower courts are more judicially
activist than the Supreme Court in relation to the political branches and the
bureaucracy. Some people argue that lower court judges, who are relatively
young, tend to be more activist than Supreme Court justices, who are
considerably older. Age, however, does not seem to be a determining factor
of judicial activism. Still other critics argue that Supreme Court justices were
educated and trained, and even practiced law, under the prewar legal system
and are sympathetic to the conservative government's ideologies and policies,
while lower court judges have been mostly educated and trained under the
new constitutional spirit, which often sets them apart from the conservative
government and its policies. Yet, there does not seem to be any meaningful
correlation between the legal education and socialization of judges, on the
one hand, and judicial activism on the other. Overall, the Supreme Court and
the lower courts more often than not agree rather than disagree on
constitutional policies, and their agreements tend to render them judicially
nonactivist vis-i-vis the political branches.
17. 27 Keishfi 547.
18. See H. ITOH, supra note 2, at 274-76.
19. Park v. Japan, 26 Keishu 631 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 20, 1972).
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III
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OF THE SUPREME COURT
The first type of judicial activism was affected by a policy change on the
side of a political branch. In 1964, the Diet amended the Pharmaceutical
Code to give a prefectural governor the authority to deny any new application
for a license to open a drugstore if the proposed site for the new store would
be too close to existing stores. When the plaintiff was denied a license, the
Supreme Court unanimously ruled 20 that both the amendment to the
Pharmaceutical Code and the Hiroshima Prefectural Ordinance enacted to
administer the Code violated the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of
occupation, since the governor failed to demonstrate any evidence of a
widespread practice of dispensing substandard drugs due to excessive
competition among drugstores in some locations. It is interesting to note that
the amendment to the Code was a direct result of strong lobbying activities by
the owners of existing stores to limit the opening of new stores that would cut
into their economic profits.
The second type ofjudicial activism resulting from a new judicial policy is
best illustrated by the patricide case. In 1950, the Supreme Court sustained
the constitutionality of Article 205 of the Criminal Code, which imposed
much heavier penalties upon patricide than other forms of manslaughter.2 1
In 1973, however, the Court, composed of different justices, agreed with the
Utsunomiya District Court, which held that the criminal provision on patricide
is unreasonably harsh and exceeds the limit necessary to achieve legislative
objectives that can be better served by applying Article 199 to the
manslaughter of lineal ascendants. 22 The present Criminal Code was adopted
before World War II, and much of it was revised in 1947 to realize the
fundamental human rights embodied in the 1947 Constitution. But Article
200 was not touched then or later. In the absence of legislative change in the
Criminal Code on patricide, the Supreme Court changed its judicial
precedent and conflicted with the Diet, which has not yet reconciled the
patricide provision with the equality clause of the Constitution.
A variation on the second type of judicial activism is discernible when the
Supreme Court declares unconstitutional an existing public policy. With the
adoption of the new Constitution in 1947, the Diet revised, amended, or
added to public policies that had been legislated under the Meiji Constitution,
to accord better with the spirit of the new legal order. Yet some of these
policies were not challenged in a lawsuit until much later. When they were
finally challenged, they were declared unconstitutional. One such instance is
the Supreme Court decision on the Forest Code in 1987.23 The Forest Code
prohibits a co-owner or co-owners whose share is singly or jointly less than
20. Umehara v. Japan, 29 Minshfi 572 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 30, 1975) (affirming decision of
Utsunomiya Dist. Ct.).
21. 4 Keishfi 2037.
22. 27 KeishfO 265.
23. Hiraguchi v. Hiraguchi, 41 MinshOi 408 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 22, 1987).
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one-half of the value of the community forest from requesting to have his or
their communal forest partitioned or subdivided. Its legislative intent is to
prevent community property from being divided, which would harm
conservation of the forest. The Supreme Court nonetheless ruled that this
provision would deprive co-owners of their constitutional rights to property.
The third type of judicial activism emerges when both the policymakers
and the Court change their respective policies and when such changes are in
opposite directions and/or at different paces. The Kurokawa
malapportionment case2 4 demonstrated the judicial activism of the Supreme
Court in 1976 when both the Diet and the Court made changes in the same
direction but at different rates. In 1964, the Supreme Court, by dismissing a
voter's charge of malapportionment in the election of the House of
Councillors, reasoned that apportionment in a national election is left to the
discretionary power of the Diet and that only in the case of extreme inequality
in voting can a court declare the election invalid.2 5 Thereupon, the Diet
initiated a partial reapportionment in some of the most underrepresented
metropolitan areas. Yet in 1976 the Court declared an election
unconstitutional in violation of the one-man, one-vote principle. The chain of
events surrounding the 1964 decision, the subsequent policy change by the
Diet, and the 1976 decision reversing the 1964 precedent suggest that the
Diet and the Court made policy changes in the direction of correcting
malapportionment, but at different paces.
IV
THE NATURE AND PROSPECT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
The political branches have shown a measure of sensitivity whenever the
Supreme Court has declared their policies unconstitutional. Following the
Supreme Court decisions in the Pharmaceutical Code case, 26 the confiscation
of the third party's property case,27 the Agricultural Land Code case, 28 and
the Forest Code case, 29 the Diet quickly removed the unconstitutional
portions of each legislation and restored harmony with the Supreme Court.
Only in the patricide and malapportionment cases has the Diet not revised,
respectively, Article 200 or 205 of the Criminal Code or the apportionment
schedules in the Public Officials Election Act.
Judicial culture throughout the Tokugawa feudal period and the Meiji
oligarchy instilled judicial restraint in the Japanese body politic. Judicial
restraint persists among judges who view it as their primary function to settle
legal disputes within the narrow confines of the law provided by legislators
24. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, 30 MinshO 223 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 14,
1976).
25. Koshiyama v. Tokyo Metropolitan Election Commission, 18 Minshul 270 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
Feb. 5, 1964).
26. 29 Minshfi 572.
27. Nakamura v. Japan, 16 Keishfi 1593 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 28, 1962).
28. Hayashi v. Governor, Aichi Prefecture, 25 Minshf6 1 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Jan. 10, 1971).
29. 26 Keish6 631.
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and administrators. Even if judges declare the unconstitutionality of public
acts and actions, they are most reluctant to suggest policy guidelines to rectify
unconstitutional policies. For instance, in the 1976 malapportionment case,30
the Supreme Court dismissed the portion of the appeal that sought to nullify
the results of the unconstitutionally held election and noted that a judicial
nullification of the election result would not correct any error already
committed, but would instead disrupt legislative processes. Furthermore, the
Court failed to suggest any guidelines regarding the discrepancy in several
election districts of the ratio between the voting population and the number
of Diet seats apportioned, and the discrepancy that could be tolerated without
violating the equality of voting rights.
Policymaking in Japan is often dominated by the ruling LDP (which is
really a conservative party), by the national bureaucrats, and by the lobbyists
of large corporations. Such policymaking is generally referred to as
triumvirate decisionmaking. Of the three groups, superbureaucrats are in
control of the actual legislative processes. They have both expertise and
experience in policymaking. Since the LDP has been in power over thirty-five
years, bureaucrats are quite familiar with the policy ideas and preferences of
the conservative ruling party. Judges are another type of bureaucrat in that
they are career judges from day one after their graduation from the Judicial
Research and Training Institute until their retirement. On the other hand,
judges overall are highly capable and independent thinkers; they are not
trained or expected to think like normal politicians or bureaucrats.
The legislative process engages policymakers who are expected to pursue
power, prestige, and personal interests. The bureaucratic process is
characterized by simple rulemaking that takes into account support and
feedback from the people. Many judges are reluctant, if not incompetent, to
dispose of a legal dispute concerning the propriety of specific social or public
policies. They would rather leave policy decisions to politicians and
bureaucrats. Only when the unconstitutionality of public policy becomes so
obvious, or administrative discretion becomes so unreasonable and arbitrary,
would the judiciary dare to declare the governmental actions null and void.
So far the Supreme Court has declared only a half-dozen acts of national
legislation unconstitutional.
Against this general background, let us speculate briefly about the
prospects for each of the three types of judicial activism in the near future.
The chance that the Court will follow its own judicial precedent in the face of
a policy change by the political branches is very slim. This type of judicial
activism is likely to happen when there are slow changes in the composition of
the Court and more rapid changes in the composition of the political branches
of government. The bureaucrats and the politicians have essentially remained
in office under the conservative LDP government for the past thirty-five years,
or over forty years if we count the LDP's predecessors. Major policy changes
30. 29 MinshOi 572.
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may emerge if opposition political parties, like the Japan Socialist Party
("JSP"), become the majority party in the Diet, either singly or in coalition,
and legislate new policies significantly different from those of the LDP while
the LDP-appointed Supreme Court adheres to the precedents it created
during the LDP government. Due to a very high annual turnover of the
justices, even this activism will not last long because the new government will
start appointing new justices of its choice. In short, rapid changes in the
Supreme Court membership and incremental policy changes in the
government will continue to work against the first type of judicial activism.
The chance of the second type of judicial activism emerging is even
smaller. The Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to change its
judicial precedents for fear of upsetting the status quo and the predictability
of public policymaking. Whenever the Court changed its precedents in the
past two decades, it has changed earlier judicial activism to judicial restraint
vis-i-vis the political branches. Unless the future Supreme Court is packed by
reform-oriented justices, the current judicial restraint is here to stay for a long
time. Yet it would be illogical for the LDP to appoint progressive justices who
would decide constitutional issues contrary to the party's ideology on national
security, public welfare, and civil liberties issues. Should an opposition party
like the JSP succeed the LDP government, it will appoint more progressive
justices than the LDP. One weakness of this scenario is that such a new
government may not be able to overcome the well-fortified judicial
bureaucracy of the Supreme Court General Secretariat, which effectively
controls judicial appointment. Japanese judges, like their counterparts
elsewhere, are basically status quo-oriented and would think twice before
changing judicial precedents. At the same time, a variation of the second type
of judicial activism is likely to emerge from time to time when the Supreme
Court reviews and declares unconstitutional many other provisions of both
legislative and administrative laws that were enacted shortly after World War
II but that have never been tested in a court of law. It is logical, then, to
assume that the likelihood for the third type ofjudicial activism, where a court
becomes a catalyst for social change, is once again very small.
V
CONCLUSION
Japan is a bureaucratic state in which high-ranking administrators shape
and reshape many public policies. Courts have been very willing to defer
their judgment to that of bureaucrats and politicians on sociopolitical
policymaking. Indeed, one of the key reasons for the successful operation of
judicial review on Japanese soil is the sparse and cautious invocation of this
newly acquired constitutional power, lest the powerful political branches
become upset by any appearance ofjudicial superlegislation. It seems that the
Supreme Court's strategies of maintaining a low profile and of judicial
restraint toward the legislative and executive branch have paid off to preserve
and consolidate the institution of judicial power. Only when the Supreme
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Court perceives that civil liberties and civil rights are at issue has the highest
tribunal in Japan been inclined to declare laws and regulations
unconstitutional. Of a total of six legislative codes found partially
unconstitutional, two violated equality under law, 31 one contravened due
process, 32 one breached freedom of occupation, 33 and two transgressed
private property rights.34 Thus, all six cases involved fundamental human
rights, which are better known as civil liberties. Otherwise, Japanese judges
do not wish to play an activist role in policymaking. Most constitutional
scholars are disappointed by the judicial nonactivism of the Supreme Court.
There is also nothing in the Constitution or any other law to prevent judges
from assuming a catalyst role in social change; but the judicial and legal
culture, social conditions, and the configuration of the governing power in
Japan are not conducive to judicial activism. The people of Japan will have to
continue to look to the political branches for the realization of the
constitutional aspirations of pacifism, popular sovereignty, and even
fundamental human rights.
31. Aizawa, 27 Keishii 265; Kurokawa, 30 MinshfO 223.
32. Nakamura, 16 Keishai 1593.
33. Kakukichi, 29 Minshf6 572.
34. Hayashi, 25 Minshfi 1; Hiraguchi, 41 Minshfi 408.
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